Building the Surface Navy

February 2011 Navy

By RADM Casey W. Coane, USN (Ret)

Navy Achieves a Big Step Forward for LCS

As we reported last month, the Navy surprised Congress and a lot of us right after the elections by changing its strategy for future LCS procurement. During the “lame duck” session, the Navy broke from the plan to down select to one hull form and, instead, asked Congress to approve a strategy of buying ten more of each ship design. (See CDR Aaron Bresnahan’s “Communications” column in the January edition of Navy, pg. 24.) The Navy announced that both prime contractors, Lockheed Martin and Austal USA, had gotten their price down to a point that, through fixed price contracting, both are now affordable. While the Navy did not initially make public the actual price for the contracts, it is believed that they are very close to the Congressionally mandated ceiling of $460 million per ship. Sources tell AUSN that the AUSTEL USA bid may have been slightly lower than Lockheed Martin’s. Regardless, at a price of $450 million or so, that is a huge difference from the $600 million plus that the two lead ships cost. The Navy and the two shipbuilders did what they said they would do, so we ought to give them credit. Because the Department is now operating under a Continuing Resolution through March of this year, each company will receive a contract for one new ship with options for nine more. Once a final Defense Appropriations bill is passed by the 112th Congress, the additional monies should be forthcoming.

That the Navy was successful in convincing Congress to authorize ten more of each ship type is a tribute to careful maneuvering by the CNO and Secretary Mabus. Both were seen on Capitol Hill speaking with important lawmakers during the month of December. Admiral Roughead is no stranger to the congressional processes having served in the Navy’s Office of Legislative Affairs, and the Navy can be proud of the CNO’s victory in what was considered by many to be a long-shot effort. No doubt, the CNO was helped by the argument that moving ahead with twenty ships in two yards vice ten ships initially in one was a good story for job creation. As we have reported earlier, some in Congress were clearly not pleased with the Navy’s strategy shift during the short session. They criticized the Navy for not providing details of the twoship plan as to basing, training pipelines, and supply chain. At the end of the day, Congress went along; but the Navy will have some fence-mending to do.

So what is next for LCS? Presently, Lockheed Martin and Austal USA each have their second ship well along with delivery expected next year, 2012. Under the new contracts, the fifth and sixth ships should be started soon. The Navy originally intended to base the LCS fleet in San Diego but is reported to be considering Mayport, Florida, as well. Presumably, one hull form would be in San Diego and the other in Mayport, simplifying the supply chains. That basing strategy would best be served if either ship could perform all missions as originally intended. Now that the Navy has two ships with considerably different characteristics, it may find one more suited to a particular mission than another – mine warfare, for example, where Austal’s aluminum hull might provide an advantage.

While the Navy has a victory here, there is a lot of work to be done as with any major acquisition program. Originally planned as a $220M ship, the Navy is now buying $450M ships. The Austal ships use an open architecture combat system designed by General Dynamics. The Lockheed Martin ships are designed around the Lockheed COMBATSS-21 system which is compatible with current Navy combat systems. The Navy apparently desires a common system now that it is buying both ship types and that certainly will result in more development costs. The ships rely on at least three mission modules designed to be quickly interchangeable (24 hours at a maintenance port facility) – Mine Warfare, ASW, and Surface Warfare modules. Each module is expected to cost in the $50M range. The systems design of the modules themselves is running well behind schedule, and the choice of systems to be included in the various modules is not set. Now that the Navy is buying both ships, the modules need to be adaptable to both combat systems, etc. Sources tell AUSN that integration could result in an additional two-year delay.

The mission modules are designed to provide mission flexibility and cost efficiency for what is essentially a frigate-sized vessel. Certainly, without the fielded modules, the Navy risks being accused of buying “empty hulls.” That would be a bit of an exaggeration, but some in Congress have already voiced such concerns. All that said, these new ships, incorporating a lot of unmanned vehicle technology, will ultimately provide much more capability than the FFG-7, MCM, and MHC class ships that they will replace.