Editor’s note: We interviewed VADM Kilcline in his historic offices at Naval Air Forces Headquarters on North Island Naval Air Station. He was most generous with his time during his annual Retired Aviation Flag Conference, and we appreciate his consideration. The conference and the interview were particularly enjoyable for your editor as he once worked there when it was known as Air Pac.
NRA: Admiral, just about two years ago here in your offices, I asked your predecessor, VADM Zortman, if he believed that the Naval Aviation Enterprise that he and VADM Massenberg had developed was institutionalized such that it would survive into the future. He assured me that he believed that it would. A two-part question: Was he correct? Since all programs change over time, what is different about the Enterprise today from two years ago?
VADM Kilcline: Admiral Zortman was absolutely correct in predicting that the NAE would survive into the future. The NAE touches more parts of Naval Aviation now than at any other time in its history. That improvement, in fact, is part of the answer to the second part of your question. Quite a bit about the NAE has changed in the past two years. The principles of the NAE – process, transparency, metrics, and accountability – have remained constant; and we are as committed to them as ever. However, those principles are evident deeper into the organization, and there is a much greater familiarity with them throughout the NAE. A great example of how the Enterprise has changed is the partnership we have with the Marine Corps. We now report on six Marine Corps Type Model Series (AV-8B, CH-53D/E, EA-6B, FA-18, KC-130T/J); and LtGen Trautman, the Deputy Commandant for Aviation, USMC, is a member of the Executive Committee. We also have MARFORCOM, MARFORPAC and MARFORRES as Extended Members of the Air Board. In fact, the NAE logo was changed to show more prominently our Marine Corps partnership in the Naval Aviation Enterprise. Additionally, we are establishing closer ties with Joint stakeholders such as DLA and the JSF JPEO, which help to improve the coordination<br /> and understanding among our services. Another change in the NAE has been our increased emphasis on warfighting and executing the Maritime Strategy. Generating warfighting readiness while simultaneously managing key processes is an important balance. So what we used to refer to as the NAE Board of Directors is now the Air Board, but we are still committed to gaining efficiencies and reducing costs. We are warfighters working to improve how we manage our business. We are not business executives trying to manage warfighting. That’s<br /> important to me. There have been a number of other improvements and accomplishments in the past two years, such as the publication of our first NAE Strategic Plan in 2008, and the stand-up of an Integrated Resource Management Team to support our three Cross-Functional Teams. Bottom line from my perspective is that the NAE is alive and well, and we continue to mature and improve.
NRA: What is the single most important equipment issue that the Enterprise faces in the next four years?
VADM Kilcline: My top priority is getting to our next class of carriers, the USS GERALD R. FORD-class. We’ve commissioned the final NIMITZ-class carrier, USS GEORGE H.W. BUSH (CVN 77). The FORD-class is our first major investment in CVN design since the1960s. PCU FORD is under construction at Newport News right now, and that ship represents an equipment issue for the NAE that will be important not just over the next four years, but for decades. Another important NAE equipment challenge over the next four years is the management of multiple platform transitions. Ongoing transitions include FA-18E/F Super Hornet, MH-60R/S, EA-18G Growler, V-22 Osprey, UH-1Y, AH-1Z, and C-130J. Upcoming transitions include the P-8 Poseidon, Hawkeye E-2D, F-35 Lightning, CH-53K, and new Unmanned Aerial Systems such as BAMS and Scan Eagle. Our challenges during these transitions include maintaining and supporting legacy platforms, sustaining logistic support for two platforms, and meeting manning requirements while sequencing the transitions so that we continue to meet operational requirements. These are real challenges, but planning and execution are proceeding well; and I’m confident we will remain on course.<br /> For us to equip the Force properly, another major focus area is optimizing the operational availability of our aircraft carriers. Key to this effort is maintaining the combat capability and readiness of USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65) through her remaining service life. We’re applying the lessons learned from maintaining this 46-year-old nuclear powered aircraft carrier to Nimitz-class carriers during refueling overhauls and beyond as they enter the second half of their 50-year service life. Many of these lessons learned, such as managing the obsolescence of equipment and the preservation of tanks and voids, have already been integrated into our carrier maintenance programs. Another important outcome is the development of a more robust teaming with our CVN technical community, a much-needed partnership for us to reach efficiently the planned 50-year service life of our nuclear powered aircraft carriers.
NRA: If we understood correctly, one of the early reasons for bringing responsibility for aviation training and Replacement Air Group (RAG) squadrons under your cognizance was to schedule better aviation training to get the product to the fleet squadrons more efficiently and to reduce training pools in the pipeline. How are we doing in that regard today? When a pilot or NFO begins training, can we accurately predict when they will arrive at their fleet squadron?
VADM Kilcline: Training of Naval Aviators is a multi-step process. It begins in the Naval Air Training Command where newly commissioned officers are designated as Naval Aviators or Naval Flight Officers and awarded their wings of gold. It then progresses on to the Fleet Replacement Squadrons (FRSs) where they are taught the basics of their fleet platform, and culminates in the fleet where the aviators earn their final advanced qualifications. Up until recently, ownership of the aviator training continuum was split between two major Navy command and<br /> budget authorities. The Naval Air Training Command “belonged” to the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) and received funding through them, while the FRSs and the fleet squadrons fell under me as the Commander, Naval Air Forces and were funded from my budget. This splitting of the funding sources resulted in barriers that made it difficult, if not impossible, to shift training up and down that continuum between the Naval<br /> Air Training Command and the FRSs. The purpose of moving the Naval Air Training Command from NETC to CNAF was to eliminate that artificial funding barrier and allow the aviation training professionals to put training where<br /> it needs to be to train our aviators without regard to from who’s pot of money the training is funded. We aren’t there quite yet; the Naval Air Training Command has aligned under me, but the budget won’t be shifted over until 1 October of this year with the beginning of the new fiscal year. Once that occurs, moving the training up and down the continuum will be seamless. As we produce Naval Aviators through this training, our goal isn’t simply to push them to the fleet on a set timetable. Instead, the goal is to provide trained Naval Aviators to the fleet when they are required––not before, and not after. The consequence of training too few pilots is reduced readiness in the fleet. The consequence of training too many is wasted dollars and ultimately reduced readiness in the fleet, as those dollars are not available to put where they are most needed. The need for aviators in the fleet changes with squadron stand ups and disestablishments, with varying pilot retention rates, and with other real-world effects on the size of the fleet. As those numbers typically change faster than our manpower accession plans change, our Naval Aviator Production Process (NAPP) becomes a buffer between the accession plan and the changing fleet requirement. If the purpose of the NAPP were to push aviators to the fleet on a set timetable, regardless of the fleet requirement, we would definitely be able to predict accurately when an aviator would arrive in the fleet. However, the variable of getting the aviator to the fleet only when he/she is required makes the process much less predictable. The NAPP reduces the total cost of training aviators as it limits how many are trained to only how many are actually required, and it does reduce the time an individual typically spends in active training once that individual steps into the training pipeline.
NRA: What is the single most important personnel issue that the Enterprise faces in the next four years?
VADM Kilcline: The most important personnel issue for Naval Aviation is tied to those platform transitions that I’ve mentioned. The next few years are critical; because in order to meet our global commitments while we transition to next generation aircraft and aircraft carriers, we have to attract and train the most talented young men and women from America’s diverse population. We need young people who are capable of successfully employing these highly technical combat systems. At the same time, we must find ways to retain our best and brightest officers and enlisted Sailors, not only to support our current operational requirements, but also to prepare our future generation of leaders in Naval Aviation.
NRA: We have read recently that $900 million or so has been taken out of the 2010 budget for the P-8 program in order to finish the third ZUMWALT (a ship that the Navy n longer says<br /> is the right ship for the future). What is the status of the P-8<br /> program? How many are we going to buy, and how are you going to adjust for this funding cut?
VADM Kilcline: The P-8 Program continues to enjoy support at all levels within the Navy. We are confident our POM 10 procurement quantities reflect the proper balance between resources and requirements. That said, it would be inappropriate to discuss further details before the FY10 budget is submitted to Congress later this year.
NRA: Today, the force includes eleven carriers. It is our understanding that we are going to drop to ten decks for some period of time. What is driving that decision and are you worried that if we do that, forces external to the Navy might bring enough pressure to force that as a permanent number?
VADM Kilcline: We are committed to maintaining 11 operational carriers. The GEORGE H. W.BUSH (CVN 77) was commissioned in January and is the numerical replacement for USS KITTY HAWK (CV 63) which will decommission following BUSH’s sea trials and delivery. This will keep the force at 11 operational carriers until September 2012, when we must begin the inactivation of the USS ENTERPRISE (CVN 65). In 2012, ENTERPRISE will have reached the end of her service life of 51 years, and her numerical replacement will be the GERALD R. FORD (CVN 78), scheduled to be delivered in November 2015. During this short 33-month period, the force structure will indeed drop from 11 to 10 carriers. The Navy is submitting a request to Congress this year, as we have in the past, requesting legislative authorization to reduce temporarily the carrier force structure to 10 ships. To mitigate against an unforeseen national crisis, the Navy will place the KITTY HAWK in a higher level of inactivation upon her decommissioning to allow her to be reactivated should circumstances warrant. By making some adjustments to our maintenance and operating schedules during this 33-month time frame, the Navy can meet its operational requirements. Once CVN 78 joins the fleet in 2015, the Navy will again return to 11 operational carriers and will<br /> maintain 11 operational carriers for the foreseeable future.
NRA: Does the new Maritime Strategy change CVN force relevance, capability, or capacity requirements?
VADM Kilcline: Our CVN force is essential to the execution of the new Maritime Strategy. Aircraft carrier air power plays a critical role in every strategic imperative and core capability laid out in the strategy. Across the full spectrum of mission areas, from major combat to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations, our aircraft carriers provide the access, flexibility, and persistence that only carrier-based air power can provide. The programmed force structure level of 11 nuclear aircraft carriers and 10 carrier Air Wings is considered the minimum force level necessary to execute the strategy successfully. And, both our CVN and Air Wing recapitalization programs will provide us even more capability to meet successfully the broad range of missions defined by the strategy.
NRA: We have a projected gap in numbers of F/A-18’s before the F-35 arrives. When and what is the size of that gap and how are you going to manage it?
VADM Kilcline: We continue to analyze and evaluate all of thevariables that affect the Strike-Fighter Shortfall (SFSF). Legacy Hornets were originally built for a service life of 6,000 hours. Projections published earlier this year of a peak Navy shortfall of 69 aircraft in 2017 assumed, among other things, that the Hornet service life would be extended to 10,000 hours. Based on updated engineering analysis from additional service life assessments, we are now using 8,600 hours for service life projections. A service life of 10,000 hours is achievable with additional unprogrammed resources. In addition, we continue to show the strain of GWOT tasking, which has increased the utilization rate of our current aircraft. These factors have increased our projected shortfall, the extent of which would be felt from 2012 to 2022, impacting the Navy’s ability to field 10 active Airwings and support the Fleet Response Plan (FRP). There is no single solution for managing the Strike-Fighter Shortfall; it will require several efforts. First, we must maintain program wholeness for the Joint Strike Fighter. This includes an<br /> on-time IOC of the JSF-C variant in 2015 and procuring the programmed quantity. Any delay in the IOC or reduction in the planned procurement quantities for JSF will increase the SFSF. In addition, the Navy is considering procuring additional F/A-18E/F Super Hornets and funding the service life extension of Legacy Hornets to 10,000 hours. The decision to extend the service life of legacy aircraft or to procure additional new aircraft reflects a balance of economy and capability. Finally, we must continue the sustainment and modernization of our legacy aircraft to ensure that the capability of our aging fleet keeps pace with the threat. The Navy is actively looking at all of these avenues to ensure that we maintain the capacity and capability required by the Maritime Strategy through 2030.
NRA: The projected cost of the F-35 continues to rise. What is the Navy doing to manage that and do you see F-35 as a target for cuts in the new administration?
VADM Kilcline: The cost of the F-35 has increased, but cost trends have stabilized recently with the design maturity of all three variants. In fact, CF-1, the first Navy F-35, is on schedule for its first flight in October 2009. The program has accomplished some significant milestones and overcome many challenges over the past year. The Navy continues to work with the Air Force and the Department of Defense Cost Analysis Improvement Group (CAIG) in order to understand and predict cost growth and risk. The F-35’s future capabilities, timely development, and on-time fielding are critical components of the Navy’s solution for our Strike Fighter Shortfall.
NRA: What is the state of Active-Reserve Integration, and where is it heading in the future?
VADM Kilcline: Years ago, Reserve Naval Aviation was a very separate force from the Active Component Naval Aviation. That is no longer the case. Because of Active Reserve Integration (ARI), Reserve Naval Aviators are an integral part of every facet of Naval Aviation. If you are a Naval Aviator in flight training, 19% of your flights will be flown with a Reserve instructor. If you are a Naval Aviator going through Fleet Replacement Squadron (FRS) training, up to 19% of your flights will be flown by a Reserve instructor (percentage differs in different communities). If you fly against adversary air in the FRS, during AIRWING training, during C2X or JTFEX, it is more likely than not that you are flying against Reserve aviators. If you fly or have your equipment sent via Navy transport or heavy lift aircraft, you are being flown by aircraft manned by Reservists. Reserve VR crews provide 100% of Navy transport and heavy lift. Reserve helo crews are flying in Iraq, Reserve Prowler crews deploy to Afghanistan, Reserve Hawkeye crews fly 100 percent of the Navy E-2 counter drug deployments, and Reserve P-3 crews are an essential part of the wartime requirement for ASW crews. ARI has brought Reserve aviation into the mainstream of Naval aviation. Their contribution is now a recognized and relied upon part of how we do business in Naval Aviation. Where we are now is charting a future course for the contribution of Reserve Naval Aviation, both from a standpoint of hardware (aircraft) and how we employ Reserve Naval Aviation. Aging Reserve Force aircraft will need to be modernized or replaced in the not-too-distant future. We are currently analyzing the need for replacing our Reserve Prowlers with Growlers, and replacing P-3 aircraft with the P-8. As to employment, we want to capitalize on our successes and hone our Reserve Force for the future. The production value of Reserve support for training (CNATRA, FRS, and adversary) may likely be growth areas. VR transport production will remain at current levels. We are currently looking at each Reserve squadron to determine the best method of providing day-to-day readiness production for the fleet (FRS training, San Clemente Island operations, for examples), individual or crew augmentation as required, and detachment or deployed operations where necessary. We have received great value from relying on the experience of the seasoned Naval Aviators that reside in the Naval Air Force Reserve. I expect that reliance to continue, the integrations to get better, and the future to be one as an essential part of Naval Aviation.
NRA: Many of our readers will be interested in the Navy’s VR community. How is the transition from the C-9’s to the C-40’s coming along? What do you see as the future replacement for our C-20’s?
VADM Kilcline: All. Our VR community is a very capable force in support of Navy operations around the globe. They operate very efficiently, offering significant savings over all other alternatives. Additionally, Navy lift provides the warfighter with a solution for emergent requirements, including casualty repair, personnel sustainment, and delivery of critical cargo. Analysis of the Navy’s need for transport aircraft has determined a minimum requirement for 17 C-40’s. Currently, we have nine on hand and have two additional C-40s being delivered in FY 11. The remaining six aircraft will be programmed as NAE priorities dictate in future year budgets. Until the delivery of the C-40’s is complete, we will continue to rely on the C-9 Skytrain aircraft. The C-37 is replacing the Navy’s Executive Transport C-20D aircraft. Three of the C-37’s are operating today. One remaining aircraft will be programmed as the C-20D aircraft approaches the end of its service life. There is no scheduled replacement for CNAFR’s C-20G aircraft. Some of its operations, as well as those of the C-9B, will be folded under the significantly enhanced capabilities of the C-40A. Consolidating the six mainline logistic type/model/series aircraft into three will enable CNAFR to reduce supply, maintenance, and training costs.
NRA: What is ahead for our C-130 squadrons? Are we planning their replacement?
VADM Kilcline: The requirement for Navy heavy lift is 24 C-130 aircraft. We currently operate 19 C-130T’s. As the USMCR transitions to the C-130J, we are exploring the possibility of keeping a limited number of Marine KC-130 aircraft in service to bring the Navy inventory up to the required 24 aircraft. To keep this inventory viable, we will need an investment in avionics to keep in compliance with FAA mandated avionics and navigation technology requirements. We are also working to determine if recapitalization of the Navy heavy lift requirement with C-130J
NRA: A number of years ago, we began to “neck down” type model and series in our helicopter community. How is that plan progressing? Is it working out as we intended and where, if any, have we had problems?
VADM Kilcline: The Helicopter Master Plan was a requirementsbased acquisition strategy to recapitalize the Navy’s aging helicopter force while reducing future operating costs and expanding warfighting capabilities and missions. Naval Aviation concluded that it could neck down from four communities (HC/HS/HSL/HM) and five airframes (CH-46D/SH-60F/HH- 60H/SH-60B/MH-53E) to two communities (HSC/HSM) and two airframes(MH-60S/MH-60R) with a determination to be made in the future to recapitalize the MH-53E. Originally, the Helicopter Master Plan envisioned the MH-60S, utilizing a suite of five Organic Airborne Mine Countermeasures (OAMCM) systems, as the replacement for the MH-53E in its mine-hunting role, around 2015. Because of developmental delays in the OAMCM systems and ongoing analysis of our heavy lift requirement, we are assessing the best way forward regarding the future of the MH-53E. In addition to reducing the number of fleet T/M/S, the venerable UH-3H and HH-1N, previously used in shore station support roles, have been replaced by the SH-60F. Ultimately, the SH-60F will be transition to the MH-60S for support roles. A major objective of the Helicopter Master Plan was to increase efficiency within the NAE. By necking down to two primary T/M/S, the NAE has and will continue to enjoy efficiencies gained through the common cockpit, common engines/ transmissions, and rotor blades. As the MH-60R/S will ultimately comprise 95% of the Navy’s helicopter force, the Helicopter Master Plan has been a very successful planning tool. The Navy’s 2002 Helicopter Concept of Operations (CONOPS) leveraged the acquisition efficiencies of the Helicopter Master Plan, brought operational efficiencies through the reorganization of squadrons aligned with the warfighting requirements of Navy Carrier Strike Groups and Expeditionary Forces, and is the basis for the Navy’s Helicopter Force Structure.
NRA: We have thrown some pointed questions at you, and you have been most gracious to answer them. I’ve known you long enough to know that you are passionate about Naval Aviation and this great assignment that you now have. What makes you feel good each day as you come to work in this historic building?
VADM Kilcline: I’m excited about the state of Naval Aviationtoday and where we are heading in the future. Never in our history have we been more capable and more relevant. The unique capability of our Force is in demand from the Combatant Commanders, and our versatility shows in how we are being employed around the world. Helicopters from Carrier Air Wing 8 aboard USS THEODORE ROOSEVELT, for instance, are supporting counter-piracy operations off the coast of the Horn of Africa while the rest of the air wing continues to fly combat missions supporting troops on the ground in Afghanistan. P-3’s are supporting counter-piracy ops in Central Command as well as OIF and OEF, and in SOUTHCOM they are supporting counter-narcotics missions.<br /> Naval Aviation continues to play a crucial role in humanitarian assistance and disaster response efforts, such as USS RONALD REAGAN’S support to the people of the Philippines following the typhoon there last year. Most of all, what makes me feel good when I come to work is that I know the men and women of Naval Aviation – the Sailors, Marines, and civilians on our team – are making a difference around the world that day, and every day.