February / March 2012 - Navy
By Aaron Bresnahan
A few months ago, I received feedback from a
reader that stated: “Littoral combat ship (LCS),
are you serious?” He was commenting on a posting
that AUSN had included as part of a Surface
Navy focus issue back in early 2011. He went on to argue
that the fielding of today’s LCS program would somehow
be the equivalent of Thomas Jefferson promoting, in 1807,
the build-up of coastal gunboats to defend against the
impressments of U.S. merchant Sailors, or worse yet,
would possibly lead to an underfunding or reduction in
funding for the U.S. Navy’s current aircraft carrier capability.
After I had time to reflect on the comments, I began to
wonder what causes such negative reactions to LCS. Does
everyone understand what is needed to operate effectively
in the littorals? I don’t see the LCS program as an either/
or scenario. The U.S. Navy has a real need for vessels optimized
for deep sea engagements as well as vessels capable
of fighting in the littorals. This was proven during World
War II during the Battle of Leyte Gulf, and a strong case
can certainly be made for future conflicts or contingencies.
Maybe some of the controversy or confusion surrounding
the development of the littoral combat ship over the
past decade has been the misunderstanding that this vessel
will somehow be used for riverine warfare, rather than
near-shore or even open-water missions. It could be that
the controversy over the LCS originates from those that
recall fighting within the Mekong River Delta during the
Vietnam conflict––thinking that the Navy is targeting that
mission profile once again. Both LCS Flight 1 variants are
greater than 115m in length. One would be hard pressed
to find many inland rivers around the globe that would
allow a vessel of that length sufficient room easily to
maneuver.
According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the
littorals “are typically areas on or near a shore; especially
of the sea.” From the Latin “litoralis,” it literally translates
as “seashore.” Maybe, others simply assume that if you
refer to combat in the littoral regions, then you are always
limiting yourself to action within sight of land. In other
words, the fear could be that by increasing the inventory
of LCS, the Navy may start to transform from a “blue”
water orientation to one that is more “brown.” With that
said, the LCS is not a simple patrol vessel or a coastal
gunboat. Rather than having a limited capability for
coastal operations, the LCS has immense potential due
to its interchangeable multimission packages. In fact with
today’s network-centric approach to war fighting, the LCS
provides an added layer to the onion ring, so to speak,
providing defensive (or offensive) capability in depth to a
Battle Group or Expeditionary Strike Group. Let’s, therefore,
look at some capabilities and justifications used for the
fielding of today’s littoral combat ship concept.
When the Navy marketed the need for the LCS to
Congress and to the general public, it was touted as a low
cost, multimission platform to fill the void in capabilities
between the current inventory of deep-sea vessels and
those needed for conventional and asymmetric operations
in the littorals. The LCS would have a high speed, sprinting
capability (at a minimum threshold of 40 knots) in order
to intercept quickly threats and to provide a tip of the
spear punch, directly at the enemy’s doorstep. With interchangeable
multimission modules, dedicated to intercepting
or eliminating surface or subsurface threats, it was supposed
to be a way to obtain economically a significant amount of
capability wherever the greatest need arose.*
One aspect of the LCS threshold capability that many
people overlook is its long legs. When formulating the
minimum requirements for the vessels, the Navy stipulated
that it wanted the LCS to have a transit range of more than
3500 nautical miles. By incorporating both high speed and
high endurance, the LCS is well beyond the capabilities of
most modern patrol vessels.*
When looking deeper into the previously released Flight 0
Preliminary Design––Interim Requirements as stipulated in
February 2003 by the LCS Program Management, the LCS needed
to have core capabilities and complementary mission packages
enabling it to execute essential functions while supporting at
least one other “focused mission” capability. When so configured,
“a mission package could be a combination of modules, manned
and unmanned off-board vehicles, deployable sensors, and
mission manning detachments.”*
A core capability was further defined as an arrangement
embedded into the base platform to execute core vessel functions,
such as self-defense, navigation, or other elements common to the
various mission profiles. Mission packages were defined as functional
system groupings subsequently integrated into the LCS
seaframe, which allowed it to conduct focused missions, such
as surface warfare, mine warfare, and antisubmarine warfare.
The LCS was intended to have reconfigurable or replaceable
mission modules so that it could quickly address the highest
potential threat. However, mission packages, wherever possible,
would integrate into the vessel’s basic command and control
functionality in order to minimize the use of unique system
architecture and to allow for future upgrades or system enhancements.
Other capabilities, such as maritime interdiction or
support to Homeland Defense, were considered to be inherent.*
Despite the cost overruns and “teething pains” that have
brought the program a fair bit of criticism lately, the LCS will
still be quite affordable considering the significant multimission
capability that is brought to the table. As time goes on, the
LCS capabilities are being further refined, and the concept
continues to show improvement as the Flight 1 split-buy
procurement gets underway. In any event, once deployed,
the LCS squadrons will be fully capable of fulfilling various
mission requirements. LCS will empower both joint and combined
forces to conduct operations more effectively in littoral regions
by providing a mine warfare capability, a shallow-water antisubmarine
capability, a maritime interdiction capability, and
a capability to counter asymmetric small vessel threats nearer
to shore.*
I have often heard people boast that nothing compares to
the force projection benefits and diplomatic gains that come
from seeing a Carrier Battle Group or Expeditionary Strike
Group operating just off shore. I couldn’t agree more. However,
please keep in mind that when a Carrier Battle Group can be
seen “just offshore,” it is certainly steaming in the littorals.
*Reference: LITTORAL COMBAT SHIP FLIGHT 0, PRELIMINARY
DESIGN INTERIM REQUIREMENTS DOCUMENT (PD-IRD), Serial
Number: N763F-S03-026, February 10, 2003.