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CNGR: A Template for Improving Our Navy Reserve?

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INTRODUCTION

The Commission on the National Guard and Reserves (CNGR) was authorized by the Ronald Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2005 to be the first thorough review of the National Guard and Reserves since WWII. The independent Commission was sanctioned to recommend to Congress any needed changes in law or policy to make sure the National Guard and Reserves are best postured, equipped and trained to help support the national security requirements of the United States. This paper will focus on the potential naval impact of the third and final report, *Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force*, which contains six major conclusions, 95 recommendations and 163 findings. The Commission issued this 368-page report on January 31, 2008.¹ Using the CNGR as a strategic guide, we can develop and implement a plan to improve the Navy Reserves.

The thesis of this paper will show *how* the Navy can use CNGR as a base to make this leap forward to *sustain and institute* this recent change to an operationalized Reserve force. This work will outline a strategy in how the Navy/DOD should interpret and implement the ideas put forward by the CNGR and recommend a way ahead. This can be achieved by a thorough Navy mission and billet review along with some CNGR recommended changes to improve the Navy Reserve and enhance its mission support capability now, and maintain it in the future.

This paper will analyze CNGR's recommendations even though the majority addresses Army Reserve and National Guard issues. This should come as no surprise, as the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) has stated, the Center of Gravity of the current fight is the Army.² Despite the wording, the possible effects on the Navy Reserve can be inferred from several of the generic Reserve recommendations. Regardless, the Navy can utilize some of these recommendations to increase the benefits from its Reserve forces, improving the Total Force.

Annexes to this paper will also address the recent DOD Directive and memorandum on “Managing and Institutionalizing the Operational Reserves.”

First, Why a Naval Reserve?

What is the purpose of the Navy Reserve? From Title 10, the purpose of the reserve(s) is “...provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.”³ The Navy further delineates:

The mission of the U.S. Navy Reserve Force is to provide mission-capable units and individuals to the Navy-Marine Corps Team throughout the full range of operations from peace to war. In today's environment, this new mandate takes on added meaning and responsibilities, as the Navy Reserve Force is called on to play an increasingly active role in the day-to-day planning and operational requirements of the Navy's Active Component.⁴

Based upon these mission statements, many versions on how we should re-align, or “transform” the Reserve force have been put forward. Some say we need to be a totally separate reserve, focus on non-conventional mission support, or irregular warfare. This would allow the active force to concentrate on the conventional fight. But, if current trends continue, a fully “irregular” Reserve force could induce even higher deployment rates than now. In the CENTCOM AOR, Reservists make up more than 50% of the Navy Individual Augmentations (IA's), but yet are only 20% of the total force.⁵ Reservists represent a major contributor to this unconventional use of sailors. In the short term, this is *the* SELRES essential mission. Others suggest a completely integrated Reserve-Active force at every level in the Navy. This could compromise any “strategic reserve”, as it would cease to exist. The new choices of the Secretary of Defense for future force requirements will have a direct impact on Reserve force mission sets. As the Navy comes to terms with these non-traditional missions, like nation building,

augmenting land forces such as Commander Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTTF-HOA), natural disaster relief, UAVs, and realizes its role in this Joint-Interagency fight of the future, the Reserves can become a key augment for the Total Force. In this role, the Reserves are hand-in-hand with active support in some missions, and has a strategic reserve ready for other roles.

Why can the Reserve meet both conventional and irregular/specialized mission sets? First, the skill set across the Reserve force is varied and impressive. From pilots to mechanics, intelligence support, legal, cargo handlers, linguists, security forces, and Seabees, the skill set Reserves bring to the force are a great force multiplier. This “stored capacity” allows the Navy to keep required skills on hand for up to 75% less cost than an active unit⁶, and allows a “surge” of these forces when required. This “civilian” skill set may also become more valuable as the Navy expands into more interagency and non-governmental operations.

This same strategic discussion holds true for the military as a whole. The debate on the future of the military will come to a good test in the Quadrennial Defense Review of 2010. The economic crisis of 2008, the expanding budget deficit, and a new President with increasing troop levels for the Army and Marine Corps will certainly inspire debate. Will this come at the expense of manning for the Navy (and the Air Force)? Will we need less ships and aircraft, and need to expand (even more) or intelligence analysis, boots on the ground, and interagency support/nation building forces? Perhaps. Are we a conventional army and blue water navy? Or should we gravitate towards a counter-insurgent force and brown-water Navy? The answer directly relates to the question... What kind of war will we have in the future? A recent senior Marine Corps General on a visit to the Air War College stated: “Surprise,” is what is known about future wars. From his perspective, conventional war is not over, and we can’t just concentrate on irregular warfare. “How do we create irregular warfare competency w/o losing

conventional and nuclear competency?” Almost quoting Clausewitz, the General restates: “We don’t want to be dominant in one area and negligent in others. As we know, the enemy will go where we are negligent.”⁷ This reasoning has been highlighted with the recent invasion of Russian forces into Georgia. Ironically, Georgians were being trained in Irregular Warfare at the time. Some have also faulted Israel forgetting conventional war doctrine in their recent conflict in Lebanon.

So what do we know? As the CJCS has stated, the COG for U.S forces is the Army. In their supporting role, The Navy and the Air Force will have to flex to support them with increasing BOG support for these roles. As CJTF-HOA and AFRICOM like missions continue to expand, the Reserves will be expected to fill a large amount of the initial and repeat billets. With increasing pressure on the military budget, Joint and Coalition Operations are the norm. Since we cannot predict what the enemy will do in war, we need to have some specialized sailors and have many that are flexible, and multi-qualified. If the Navy Reserves (NR) exists to support the fleet, we must also be available to “...fight across the spectrum.”⁸ We can’t afford to lose the next conventional or non-conventional conflict. For the short term the Reserves will flex to support the current need for boots on the ground, and prepare for the future. The question becomes, how many now, and how many for later?

In this effort, the Reserves must help the Navy be ready on all fronts for the long term, and be flexible enough for possible requirements. Similar to a P-3 squadron getting ready to deploy, they prepare in many different areas: ASW, ASUW, ISR, Battle-Group Operations, Counter-Drug, etc... This allows the P-3 to be used in any arena, as a flexible deterrent given changing developments and requirements. It can flex to monitoring refugees, surveillance of a pirated ship, or to surface protection for the Carrier battle group. By the same token, a

multifaceted Reserve Force can respond with an operational surge for a ship or squadron, manning for intelligence, or supplement a deployment rotation for the Cargo Handlers or Seabee battalions to share the load with the active force. In addition, IA's can be balanced with active forces to help fill COCOM requirements. In essence, we are planning to be flexible.

The question of how many Reserves to send to the AOR, what skills should they have, and which Units need more Reserves than others, can only be answered by a thorough review of Reserve billets. Each operational command must make a legitimate scrub of their reservists, how many they *actually need and utilize* in this new mission, do they have the right skills, and how much support they will require of them?

CNGR, a Start in the Right Direction...

With these ideas in mind, how can the Navy best capitalize on the CNGR's recommendations to more readily utilize and integrate the Reserves with the active force?

CNGR covered six areas:

1. Creating A Sustainable Operational Reserve
2. Enhancing the DOD's Role In The Homeland
3. Creating A Continuum Of Service: Personnel Management For An Integrated Total Force
4. Developing A Ready, Capable And Available Operational Reserve
5. Supporting Service Members, Families And Employers
6. Reforming The Organizations And Institutions That Support An Operational Reserve

Within these 6 base recommendations are 95 specific recommendations. On the whole they pave the way to the biggest revamp of the Reserves in 60 years, but as we know from Goldwater-Nichols, it may take 20 years to feel the real impact. Most of these recommendations will enhance and shape the Reserves for the 21st century, but identifying ones can we engage now can

help the Navy Reserves overcome their obstacles to be fully integrated. In the interest of space constraints, this paper will highlight several aspects to five of the six main areas.

Creating a Sustainable Operational Reserve

The CNGR concedes that out of necessity, our previous strategic reserve force has been converted to an “operational reserve.” Simply put, in order to support our National Security Strategy, the Reserves had to be tapped in order to meet troop requirements in Iraq and Afghanistan. This allowed the nation to avoid a draft and the possible public backlash while still keeping the general populace “in the fight.” Just looking at current events, this need of the Reserves will continue for some time, therefore, we must make the operational reserves sustainable. It is from this belief that the other conclusions try to support.

“The Reserve Component is operating in a new strategic environment. Reserves are no longer just weekend warriors. They are fighting and dying overseas. The scale of the mobilization is primarily the result of Operation *Iraqi Freedom*. From mid 1990 to 2001, the Reserve Component support to total force mission was about 13 million duty days. Today it is 63 million duty days, a five-fold increase. The mobilization from September 11, 2001 through the Afghan war was 77,000 reservists at peak. By the beginning of the Iraq war in March 2003, about 223,000 were mobilized, a three-fold increase. Over 300,000 of 882,142 Reserve Service members have been called up for operations in the CENTCOM Area of Responsibility. About 40 percent of forces in Iraq are from the Reserve Component. Roughly half of the Army reservists have been called up since 9/11. Call-ups are now of longer duration. During Desert Shield/Desert Storm 1990-91, call-ups lasted an average of 156 days. Regional operations in late 1990 averaged 200 days. The average today is over 300 days. Reservists are being told they can count on being activated one year in every three to five. The goal for DOD is one year in six.”⁹

The commission does go on to state the “value” of Reserve talents. It contends that a non-activated Reservist costs about 20-25% the direct cost of the same active duty member just based on annual salary. Benefits are also at a much-reduced cost as compared to the active duty as reservists do not require a dedicated military base or full time medical, dental, and family

support like an active duty member. Additionally, a reservist's retirement cost is delayed 10-20 years until that member is approximately 60 years old, where the active duty member earns his pension on day one of retirement. The other intrinsic value comes from the reservist's required military skills and supplementary civilian capabilities not otherwise available to the active force.

Is this force sustainable? After visiting Iraq and Afghanistan in Dec 2007, Gen McCaffrey (ret) remarked:

The National Guard and Reserves are too small, are inadequately resourced, their equipment is broken or deployed, they are beginning their second involuntary combat deployments, and they did not sign up to be a regular war-fighting force. They have done a superb job in combat but are now in peril of not being ready for serious homeland security missions or deployment to a major shooting war such as Korea.¹⁰

The "challenge" is keeping these valued members in the service, despite their frequent mobilizations, and a system that was not built for this constant, continued requirement for reserve support.

How is the Navy doing here? The Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) completed a recent study¹¹ on Limited Supply and High Demand (LS/HD) jobs under the current operations tempo. The CNA looked at the current rate of mobilizations, retirements, recruitment, and promotions to predict where the Navy Reserve is shorthanded. Of 42 enlisted ratings, 31 were predicted to be LS/HD within three years in one or more pay grades. Out of the 31 LS/HD ratings, *only five* were not receiving any recruiting or reenlistment incentives. The remaining 11 ratings not currently in LS/HD were receiving recruiting or reenlistment incentives, perhaps keeping them from LS/HD as well. This implies a "bubble" is building and critical shortages could burst across the majority of enlisted ratings if we don't address them or change the operations tempo.

Are the officers any better off? Of the 14 officer designators, four are predicted to be LS/HD: Special Warfare (113X), Intel (160X), Supply (310X), and Civil Engineer Corps

(510X). Unfortunately, recruiting doesn't really help higher pay grades, and the Navy Reserve's "red flag"¹² at 16 years active duty (to prevent sanctuary at 18 years) further limits an already reduced supply from the eligible Reserve workforce. Essentially, the Navy closes the door on their most qualified reservists by not allowing those close to 16 years active duty from mobilizing. This, in turn, limits the Reservist's career, since he/she is no longer eligible for long-term active-duty support. On a good note, recruiting was on track for 2008, but that does not relieve pressure from the mid to upper pay grades where deficiencies still exist.¹³

How does the CNGR address the manning problem? "...Congress and DOD must modify existing laws, policies, and regulations related to roles and missions, funding missions, personnel rules... ..if the RC are to realize their full potential to serve this nation and if existing adverse trends in readiness and capabilities are to be reversed."¹⁴ Since most foresee current mobilization trends to continue, the Navy Reserve needs more studies to see why retention rates are so low in certain skill sets, if current incentives are actually working, and, can we use different incentives to bridge the void? Do we need more recalls to active duty, sanctuary approvals, and "return to active duty" opportunities to help fill critical individual augmentation (IA) billets? One has to look no further than the multiple IA mobilization and ADSW billets available *every day* to the SELRES officer ranks. The current active Navy manning simply cannot handle the full requirement of these IA billet requests, and still man the traditional Navy billets. Incredibly, reducing the Navy another 6,000 sailors over the next three years as planned will increase IA requirements on those left in the AC and RC.

On the good side, the NR has started to approve extremely *limited* "sanctuary" requests, for Reservists to continue to serve the active force, but they are still very difficult to get approved, especially if not currently mobilized. There is also recent discussion that mobilized

reserve members will be allowed to stay on the Reserve Active Manning list so Active Duty end strength numbers will not limit their contributions, as is the case now.

Returning to active duty must be simplified if we want to fully utilize our Reserve forces, and lead us toward a real Continuum of Service. Limiting sanctuary requests effectively removes potential volunteers and your most qualified skills from your force. If a reservist is “ineligible” for more active duty because they have already contributed 16 years of active time, isn’t the Navy shortchanging itself of the valuable experience it states it desires?

Enhancing the DOD’s Role in the Homeland

Long term, the value of integrating the National Guard and Reserves with NORTHCOM, state and local agencies, and the Department of Homeland Defense is tremendous. DOD has incredible assets available in the Reserve Forces, and they are available in almost every state. Unfortunately, DOD statues are written and budgeted for military defense of the country, and not for civil or disaster responses. Here, this author agrees with the CNGR, that Congress must change Title 10, the budget, and further integrate Guard and Reserves into NORTHCOM.

Since CNGR does not mention Naval Reserve assets, the Department of the Navy will have to work with the DOD, DHS and NORTHCOM for coordination of billets and assets once the laws are adapted to this new mission. In addition, here is another opportunity to expand the amount of “Joint-Interagency” (JIA) billets. Besides NORTHCOM, billets should be created where the Navy can add, assist, and learn more about the interagency. A percentage of these billets should be required fills by reserve members. Examples could be in Dept of State, Dept of Homeland Security, Treasury, etc... If we don’t force interagency via billet fills, real interagency for the Navy will not happen. The Reserves can lead the way. A good example for RC

integration can be seen by the assignment of LTG Blum, the first National Guard member to be Deputy Commander for USNORTHCOM. DOD also concurs with this direction.¹⁵

Creating a Continuum of Service: Personnel Management for an Integrated Total Force

Here is where the Navy can make a huge impact for the future and has started to lay the groundwork. Joint, Coalition, and Interagency operations will continue to expand, and prosper with the Navy Reserve. The last QDR in 2006 stated:

The ability to integrate the Total Force with personnel from other Federal Agencies will be important to reach many U.S. objectives. Accordingly, the Department supports the creation of a National Security Officer (NSO) corps – an interagency cadre of senior military and civilian professionals able to effectively integrate and orchestrate the contributions of individual governmental agencies on behalf of larger national security interests.¹⁶

Here is a perfect place to leverage a future part of the NR. For example, we can look at USCENTCOM's Joint Inter Agency Coordination Group (JIACG), stood up after September 11, 2001. JIACG facilitates planning and coordinates information sharing between U.S. military and U.S. governmental agencies to advise the Commander, U.S. Central Command, and staff on interagency issues in the execution of U.S. Central Command's mission.

Although Secretary Rumsfeld authorized JIACGs, DOD created no additional positions. Each commander, therefore, had to staff JIACG by reassigning personnel from within an already understaffed command. The CENTCOM solution was to create temporary wartime JIACG positions using mobilized Reservists, usually found by JIACG members combing the Ready Reserve lists for familiar names. Because many Reservists work in law-enforcement in their civilian jobs, JIACG Reservists provided an unanticipated source of success through the two-for-one leveraging of their military and law-enforcement experience and contacts. After 3 years, JIACG's members are still primarily Reservists, but that pool is almost dry, and the joint manning document still does not include JIACG positions.¹⁷

Similarly, when the Navy took ownership of CJTF-HOA from the Marine Corps – how did they initially staff it? – With a large percentage of Navy Reservists! Many members of the Reserves are already members of inter-agencies and NGO's and are a valuable untapped resource for the

Navy and Joint service. They brought the correct and necessary skill sets that are often inherent in the RC that are optimal for the Phase 0 “Shaping” operations.

The Navy is already following some CNGR guidance (#17a) on Joint Education for Reservists, by expanding qualification from previous Reserve duty, expanding distance learning for JPME I/II, and in 2008, actual orders for in-residence training at our War and Staff Colleges.¹⁸ The Navy now joins its peers in recognizing and providing in-residence opportunity for its reservists. Unfortunately, the Navy often leaves some education billets unfilled that could be filled by offering those spots to reservists. Additionally, the Navy should offer PCS orders to complete a full 24 month mobilization or recall, to a joint active duty billet following War College. This “payback” would increase competency for the supported command, increase knowledge for the reservist, and most importantly, bring stability and planning to the reservists’ family. This is a win-win for the COCOM, the Navy, and the sailor. This also complies with CNGR recommendations 17b and 25.¹⁹ Currently, there is no coordination or detailing to a future Joint billet for Navy Reservists in-residence at our nation’s War Colleges.

Once mobilized, are Reserves treated the same as the AC? Once again pay/personnel rules work against the Reservist. Compared to active duty members, Guard and Reserve troops are given smaller and fewer re-enlistment bonuses; are ineligible for some vital skill bonuses; face tighter payment rules on monthly special pays; and, by law, can’t sign re-enlistment contracts while overseas, which denies them a tax advantage many active duty members receive while in the same war zone. “There shouldn’t be a difference,” said Lt. Gen. James E. Sherrard III, testifying as head of Air Force Reserve Command. Gen Sherrard and fellow Reserve leaders said in April disturbing disparities in treatment exist for mobilized troops serving alongside active duty forces. Gen Sherrard said the issue is “fair and equitable treatment.” Thomas F.

Hall, the Pentagon's point man for reserve affairs, took exception. He maintained, "There is a difference in the type of service, and being unequal is not necessarily unfair."²⁰ Hall expands his confusing statement here:

"Hall noted that a RAND study on changes in reserve retirement shows that they have only a small impact on recruiting and retention. Yet dropping the threshold age (from 60 to 55) at which benefits begin would cost \$7 billion over 10 years. Sen. Saxby Chambliss (R-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Personnel Subcommittee, questioned whether RAND had considered the expense of losing experienced reservists for lack of a better retirement plan. Hall countered that, although the RAND study is only at its halfway point, preliminary data "tell us that our younger Guardsmen and Reservists serving today ... heavily discount deferred compensation." In other words, the reserve retirement plan is not that important to them. "If the top line [dollar] remains the same, and we only have a certain amount of money to spend, ... we [should] target it towards those serving and bearing the brunt today," said Hall."²¹

Of note, Hall (and RAND) misses the point on retention by concentrating on "younger" Reservists. Of course a 19-22 year old wants money now, but I can bet mid-level sailors would respond differently. He gets the answer he wants by asking the wrong audience.

Other force planners make the argument that as the current Reserve members see the writing on the wall for repeated deployments; many will leave, to be replaced by highly motivated Reservists who are fully aware of their likely activation for extended periods of time. This doesn't make sense. Why would a sailor expecting to be activated most of the time leave active duty to come to the Reserves, when the benefits are less for the reserve sailor? Reserve duty by definition, must have down times away from activation. This allows the Reservist to concentrate on his *primary* duty: his *civilian job*. Second, how can the skills and experience of the new Reservists, match those who leave? You simply can't make a one-for-one replacement for an experienced mid-level sailor, with a new recruit. It might take a decade or more and countless dollars to develop that new RC recruit to the skill level of the lost mid-level sailor. Mid-level sailors will also be harder to replace since the size of the active component (AC) is

smaller than in previous decades. Dr. Stephen Duncan from NDU warns, “Almost full time service may well attract only those individuals who can’t compete successfully as a career soldier, and/or those who have no or few options for a successful civilian career.”²² If Continuum of Service expands, it must include better incentives to keep our mid-level sailors.

Additionally, if we look at the results of a RAND study²³ on Reserve retirement reform, we can get some understanding in the thoughts of Mr. Hall, and other pervasive arguments used for CNGR. Specifically, the RAND study looked at several options back in 2006 that were put forward as reform for Reserve retirement. Unfortunately, their arguments resulted in the summary, that it wasn’t fair or equitable to reward all Reservists wholesale, as some Reservists were getting mobilized much more than others. Hence, reform wasn’t a good tool for retention, and is very costly. Unfortunately, they never looked at the smaller option of rewarding only mobilized reservists. RAND goes on to say: “to support the total force concept, reserve retirement will need to be integrated with active reform, although the resulting systems need not be the same for each component.”²⁴ Additionally, RAND summarizes, since AC and RC service are not equitable, neither should their retirements be the same.²⁵ The message received by the reservist is, since some early Reserve retirement reform ideas are bad, all Reserve ideas are bad. Even worse, active duty time as a reservist, apparently is unequal to active time by an AC member. Finally, Reserve retirement reform is further delayed by linking it to active reform which is many years away, which RAND admits will be different anyway.

Fortunately, other opinions exist that realize the continued contributions of reservists are becoming increasingly similar to active duty, and hence their benefits should likewise be similar. In March of 2007, Lieutenant Colonel Timothy Clarke looked at the retirement systems, in the wake of an increasingly operational Reserve Force. Colonel Clarke deems that changes to the

reserve retirement system are warranted “in light of the change in the use of the reserves.”²⁶ In his summary, Clarke states: “The reduction of the age of receipt of retirement benefits increases the sense of equity with active component soldiers, especially in light of the increased use of the reserves...” Colonel Clarke, ends up being a proponent for reducing retirement age on a one-for-one rate with retirement years served over twenty. To counter the RAND argument, Reserve service is becoming more equitable with active service, so should Reserve retirement.

Recognizing a similar argument, in the FY 2008 Defense budget Congress approved a reduced retirement based on days mobilized for contingent Operations. Ironically, this supports Mr. Hall’s quote of “we [should] target it towards those serving and bearing the brunt today,” but by a different method than he envisioned by cash up front. For every 90 day increment a reservist is mobilized in support of operations (inside a fiscal year), he or she will have their retirement pay start date reduced 90 days from the current start at age 60. For example, if a sailor is mobilized for seven months (210 days) to support Operation Enduring Freedom, that sailor will start his retirement pension 180 days (2 X 90 day increments) prior to turning 60. This rewards those reservists making difficult, repeated deployments and will have a positive impact on retention, as the reservist is rewarded almost directly for his mobilization. For cost savings, the incentive only counts mobilized service from January 2008 or later and days are only counted inside a single fiscal year. Any mobilizations from September 11, 2001 to January 2008 do not count. Likewise, if a reservist was mobilized on the first of August, the 60 days to Sept 30 would not count towards a reduced retirement, as a new “90 day clock” would start October 1. In addition, members who get recalled to active duty are not included. Obviously this “gap” misses multiple deployment cycles for some reservists. Other negatives occur crossing the fiscal year as the 90-day counter resets to zero on October 1 of each year. This

“early retirement” retention tool is a great idea, but due to bad implementation and fiscal constraints, it comes across as unnecessarily complicated and misleading. It needs to be simplified and corrected.

Developing a Ready, Capable and Available Operational Reserve

Recommendation number thirty-nine states the Navy Reserve’s Full Time Support (FTS) program should be replaced with a program that provides Active Component (AC) FTS to reserves with no loss in the number of billets that support the Reserve Component (RC).

Currently, the Navy recruits FTS from the SELRES and active duty ranks to come on active duty for the expressed service to manage the reserve force. They remain on FTS duty until retirement.

Advantages of the FTS are a cadre of personnel intimately familiar with the Navy Reserve personnel, pay, orders, and readiness systems to aid the local reservists or operational command.

As for negatives, this maintains a separate career path at a huge administrative cost, and no “active duty” at the majority of Reserve drill sites. A parallel exists in the Army Reserve:

“However, the real challenge for the junior officers, including those through the rank of major, is that, although they may serve *with* a Reserve or Army Guard unit, they will not serve *in* the unit. The distinction between serving *in* as opposed to *with* is important. A junior officer may advise a Guard or Reserve unit, but he or she will not be a member of the unit. The advisor [like Navy FTS] reports up the active-duty chain of command and has no real responsibility for the performance of the unit. Although the officer may identify with the performance and goals of the unit, in the long run, the active-duty officer’s career is not affected by what the particular unit does. One result is the lack of a common culture and thereby a hindrance to the total Army’s effectiveness.”²⁷

Just like the Army, when a Navy sailor is mobilized to the operational Unit, the FTS stays behind. This quote implies we may be better off utilizing a Marine Corps model of active duty members serving as their FTS. Marine FTS are assigned to a Unit, and deploy with that Unit. That is quite a foreign idea to the Navy. We could get the same synergy of sustained support by bringing active duty to drill *in* the Units, or bring more reservists to the operational command to

drill, reducing the need for an unattached FTS who just drills *with* the Units.

A good compromise could start a transition to less use of FTS. If we draw down recruitment to the FTS community by 50%, and allow a mix of active²⁸ and SELRES recalled to active duty to slowly backfill billets, we improve on three fronts. One, we can get more FTS experience *in* the fleet by sending more FTS to operational commands. Another FTS sailor is able to help the supported command directly, aiding the commander beyond the current one Operational Support billet. This in turn, keeps the FTS member up to date on fleet requirements that he or she can take back to their next Navy Operational Support Command (NOSC) billet. Second, this allows an active duty sailor (enlisted or officer) access to reserve programs and manpower at the NOSC. This helps educate the sailor for future use of the reserves, and allows active duty knowledge to be shared directly with SELRES on drill weekends. This can be particularly helpful with or non-prior service members, or those that have been away from the force for some time. Additionally, it offers a much needed shore billet to the active force. Third, this expands active duty experience and leadership opportunities for our reservists. Many SELRES are perfectly capable of filling FTS billets with minimal screening and training. In fact, some FTS billets have been filled this way since 9-11. The common denominator here is supporting the active side with more Reservists and FTS, while “infecting” the reserve side with more active duty knowledge. Both reserve and active can benefit from this cross-culture billet filling.

Additionally, to increase availability of the RC to the AC, the following CNGR recommendations are necessary for implementation of a ready, operational force:

40b. The services should disclose fully to all prospective members of units the expected number of training days required annually to participate successfully in that unit. Annual training requirements beyond the traditional 39 days per year should be based on unit needs and accomplished by clear mutual agreement with

the individual service member regarding his or her minimum obligation.

51b. DOD should employ a contract-based service and incentive system to ensure access to the RC and to provide predictable and sustainable activations.

51c. The services should expand the number of variable participation reserve units.

51d. The contract based system of assured availability recommended here should form the basis of accessing the operational reserve category outlined in Recommendation #86.²⁹

If a reservist knows upfront what is required, and the possible benefits of drilling with particular unit, he or she knows what to expect, increasing predictability, and morale. Some billets/ratings will require extra drills or co-locations with their supported active force, while others can be located in the “prairie land” NOSCs for training, while others can harness the bandwidth available for computer based support for their operational requirements.

Reforming the Organizations and Institutions That Support an Operational Reserve

Recommendation #83 states: “RC officers and senior enlisted personnel should be selected for leadership positions in RC units without geographic restrictions.” As proposed in Recommendation #53, “reserve training travel allowances should be modified to eliminate fiscal obstacles to implementing this policy.”³⁰ These two recommendations can benefit each other, and can lay the groundwork for positive benefits from day one. Specifically, these allude to allowances for travel over 50 miles to drill sites. Currently, only some squadrons and commands are funded for travel to bring their members to drill frequently at their site. Unfortunately, programs like this are getting curtailed this fiscal year.³¹ If the Navy requires a sailor to travel away from home to go to work, they need to pay for that travel. If we don’t pay for this travel, we must accept the risk of reduced readiness, less qualified sailors for a specific billet, or reduced retention.

Using this paid travel responsibly, the Navy should send senior enlisted and officers to billets to best benefit the sailor and the Navy. “Homesteading” in a NOSC does no favors for the

sailor or the Navy. The Navy can utilize the Reserve detailer and APPLY billet program to allow the sailor to go where he can best make an impact, not just where he can afford to travel on his own dime and time. For example, right now, a Navy officer O-4 and higher can be ordered to a billet across the country with no travel money to get there. Multiply twelve months airfare, car rental, parking, and meals, and the reservist may or may not make any money from a drill weekend. Even worse, imagine an enlisted sailor in a security billet. Through billet reviews or NOSC consolidations, the billet is moved 300+ miles away from the current drill site. At \$.48/mile, a 500 mile round-trip cost this enlisted reservist \$240! How is that an incentive to keep on drilling? With our retention “bubble,” these scenarios must be addressed.

What is the Navy doing now? What should our first questions be?

After 9-11, the Navy, recognizing the need for more call-ups, started a move towards an operational reserve with Active/Reserve Integration (ARI).

“In 2004, VADM John G. Cotton, then Commander Naval Reserve Force, said about ARI: “We are going to structure, man, train, and equip the Navy’s Reserve to provide ongoing operational support to the Navy-Marine Corps team and Joint Forces, and contribute across the full spectrum of combat capabilities in support of the warfighter. Our objective is to become a relevant component of an integrated Navy operational force.”³²

VADM Cotton actually summed up his idea more concisely when he said: “The Naval Reserve is actually 100 percent individual augmentees.”³³ Out of necessity, the NR continued its march to an operational reserve force.

In 2004, the Navy directed a “zero-based” review of its SELRES personnel. This was a first step to try to shake off minimally used Cold War billet requirements. On some fronts they succeeded, but not so on others. Unfortunately, many thought the process was a bit rushed, or reviewed billets with a conventional mission mindset. In 2005, the GAO, in a congressionally mandated review found:

In conducting its review of Selected Reserve personnel requirements, the Navy established criteria and followed a structured process, but GAO noted two limitations that could have potentially affected the quality of the results. The Navy did not analyze the most cost-effective mix of active and reserve personnel and in some cases used *outdated mission documents* as the baseline for analysis.³⁴

GAO went on to recommend that future reserve personnel analyses consider cost-effectiveness in determining the mix of active and reserve personnel and are based on up-to-date data. This would allow the Navy to allocate the required resources to maintain a valid baseline for ongoing and future workforce reviews. In written comments, the Department of Defense concurred.³⁵ Despite DOD concurrence, no further large review of billets was ordered after 2004.

Swinging forward to 2008, Admiral Roughead, sent a Navy memo titled, *Tasking Assignments to Institutionalize the Operational Navy Reserve*.³⁶ Here, the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) seeks fiscal alignment with the Reserves and wants to reduce reserve funding into inactive and active duty only (similar to CNGR recommendation 22)³⁷. He also wants to conduct a “reserve capabilities assessment” with later recommendations for alignment and restructuring. Admiral Roughead also looks to provide guidance for further integration of active and reserve component management. All of these efforts should be commended, but how these questions are interpreted and answered are vital for the future of the Navy and the Reserves. Here are some questions that should be included in this “assessment”:

- Which reserve billets does the AC, for their new mission set, require?³⁸ Are we considering the force needs projected by our Secretary of Defense?³⁹
- Will the AC Units that previously used outdated mission requirements be required to perform another analysis of their Reserve requirements?
- What are the RC participation requirements for each RC billet? 39 days? 50? 90?⁴⁰

- Does the AC prefer flex-drill availability for the reservist support? Weekdays? Can they complete all required support in 2-6 combined flex-drill dates a year?
- Will the AC have enough travel funds for reservist travel to the supported command for these requirements? (Unlike today, where IDTT budgets are minimal)
- With the new skill set assessment of our Reserves directed by the CNO, do they match up with the AC requirements? If not, how much training, recruitment, or force management tools will be needed?
- Are there active duty billets in the AC commands that can be regularly filled by a recall to active duty? By a mobilization? By ADSW?
- Where will the Reservist be required to drill? The NOSC? The Supported Command? Or a new regional “Enhanced NOSC” (regional training equip avail-SIPR/VTC for telecommute, etc...) Is Tele-commuting an option? Does the Reservist even need to go to a NOSC?

How do These CNGR Recommendations Relate the Way Ahead?

More change is certainly required of our Reserve force. There is no one solution, as this 368-page report is prime example. As the active duty gets ready for another QDR in 2010, so can the Navy Reserve. Analysis of billets filled, manning shortfalls, and mobilization requirements should provide the guidance for NR development. “We’ve got to marry the expectations of the command and the individual with a system and policies that will effortlessly support them.”⁴¹ In addition, some sailors will still need to be kept in “strategic reserve” or we risk pushing our reservists to leave the service and leave a gap in required surge forces for unforeseen active requirements. This is still a primary reason the Reserve exists.

These changes will require political capital. For various reasons the Reserves were reconfigured after Vietnam, to require use of the Reserves for any substantial future conflict. For the first Gulf War this worked, due to its short duration. Unfortunately, the Reserves were not set up for long-term operational support as they are required today. So how do we go forward? What capabilities do we need to have in an operational force? Which active? Which reserve? Which ones for strategic reserve? How do we employ our reserves for each? Can we use the continuum of service to give the reservist a “choice” based on their (civilian) career availability? Can a reservist go to “standby reserve” to go to college, have children, or take a demanding civilian job, then return to operational reserve when he/she can? If we can answer yes, I believe retention, and sustained support can improve.

How can we partner with employers? Can we help the military help recruit for the civilian world? Trucking, healthcare, pilots, security/sheriff’s, etc... and the military have tremendous opportunities that overlap to help each other in keeping a vibrant workforce. The Air Force, seeing a shortage of pilots for the growing demand for UAVs, and a gap in their manning, recently sent a letter to various airlines to see if military veterans who were getting furloughed would like to return to service with the Air Force. Here, the military is recruiting from the airlines, an unprecedented thought only a few years ago. Cooperation can lead to sharing costs for retirement, training, education, with both employers allowed to gain from the other. We also must give employers and reservists more predictability, and give them some incentives for hiring a reservist (tax benefit, government contract preferences, etc...) Further research is warranted to explore more opportunities as those just announced with Wal-Mart and the Army Reserve.⁴²

We can also look to the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) Continuum of Service study.⁴³

Continuum of Service (CoS) can be viable as a Reserve Option, but not if it is perceived unfairly. It could prosper with flexible employers/employees, or ones that have predictability or enough incentives to do so. It increases the availability of Reserve members to serve the Navy, but it does so, risking the civilian careers of those same members. If corporations know that their employee will likely mobilize more often, they may be less likely to hire a reservist. Education and cooperation of employers, early retirement, and improved compensation for mobilizations are factors to help with CoS. We can expand CoS with shared costs and benefits through partnerships with employers balanced against the risk of too much AC employment.

Voluntary CoS should be explored with use of increased upfront, compensation changes. If the SELRES and the operational command concur on the required flexible support, allow more drills to the member, which will improve support to the Navy and satisfy the member. If the AC service requires even more manpower, it should then be free to lower the retirement ages, offer extra drill points, incentive pays, or TSP matching to get the required member volunteers. In the end, it will still be cheaper to use a reservist than using an active duty fill.

CoS, by definition, must include a “hiatus” from the operational reserve force. If we make members choose between their civilian employment, families, or education and the Navy, the Navy may not be the first choice. It is important to remember that Reservists have already chosen once with their feet when they left the active force for the Reserves. The Navy could allow Reservists a 12-18 month respite from mobilization once the member is in their final year of finishing a degree or civilian job certification. The member becomes more educated, is grateful for the time away from operational requirements, and down the line serves in an increased capacity for the service.

What is another risk of expanding CoS? Possibly, active duty could lose a mid-level

sailor that might have stayed to twenty years for active retirement. Now, that same sailor, can leave at the ten-year point, perhaps be tenured for a reserve pension (by another CNGR recommendation), and decide to never come back. This could lead to a heightened loss of sailors at the ten-year point, vice the current drop off at twenty years. For this reason, further study is warranted of CoS and any related retirement change currently being considered. The option of earning a reduced pension as early as ten years must be tempered as a “savings” of CoS, or it may up being more expensive through losses of manpower to active and reserve.

For the Reserve sailor, we serve to support the operational command Navy and in turn, the COCOMs. It is not so the Navy will “have a presence in all 50 states.”⁴⁴ Supporting the Total Force is the necessary aim. General Powell makes the point that soldiers, pilots, sailors, and marines “all must believe they are part of a team, a joint team that fights together to win.”⁴⁵ He goes on to describe the necessity of mission and people; people being the most important, but one mission being understood. That is, we need to follow our leaders’ vision, but have enough flexibility to quickly develop action plans, develop ideas, and perform effectively, all following the vision.⁴⁶ Here the Navy Reserve must continue to supplement the AC demands for forces and do so smartly by a reassessment of forces. For now, we must flex to meet the needs of the nation, and the nation needs to enable that continued operational support.

Conclusion

*“The Reserve Component must be operationalized, so that select Reservists and units are more readily accessible and more deployable than today.”*⁴⁷ Per the CNGR, the Reserves are operationalized, so now we must sustain and institute this change. This work outlines a strategy of “fighting across the spectrum” by contributing strategically for some units, and operationally with others. We must *balance and maintain* the requirements to have the necessary skills for the

Navy and the Total Force against being the only force with a specialized skill. If we are the sole source for some of these skills (e.g. no comparable active unit) we risk lower retention as those units could be over-mobilized. A full-time “Active” reserve force, without the active benefits, will not sustain itself.

To get this force mix correct, ensure the new CNO directed “reassessment” for institutionalizing the Reserves goes beyond the 2004 “zero based review” and is based on an active mission review and the NR requirements to get them there. This reassessment must fall in-line with the nation’s new “balanced strategy” as described by Secretary Gates:

The strategy strives for balance in three areas: between trying to prevail in current conflicts and preparing for other contingencies, between institutionalizing capabilities such as counterinsurgency and foreign military assistance and maintaining the United States' existing conventional and strategic technological edge against other military forces, and between retaining those cultural traits that have made the U.S. armed forces successful and shedding those that hamper their ability to do what needs to be done.⁴⁸

As each command decides what force requirements are necessary in the current environment, it must determine the right cost-benefit analysis of the required mix of active and reserves. Unlike 2004, cost-effectiveness must be analyzed to help man the current COCOM mission requirements. As VADM Debbink, the new Commander of the Navy Reserve stated: “...what capabilities might the active component need in its Reserve Component in the future?”⁴⁹ This is exactly the right question.

Using the outcomes of this review, analyze the SELRES and their locations related to current NOSC drill sites. For NOSC drill billets, Commander Navy Reserve Force Command (CNRFC), with Commander Fleet Forces Command (CFFC) can validate if these billets can be supported from their current NOSC/region, or can be better located near Reserve sailors. As this may reduce SELRES requirements at some NOSCs, FTS manning and current requirements for

each NOSC must be reviewed. There may be a few NOSCs underutilized that some can be eliminated, reassigning that “cost” to travel money for the affected SELRES to travel to drill.⁵⁰ For commands that require more support, bring back an enhanced IDTT program. Increased flex-drill options combined with active-duty can also make it more affordable to travel.

Reduce FTS requirements and inputs, and begin rotating FTS to fleet and joint billets more often. Backfill those FTS billets with a mix of active duty and SELRES to come on active duty for 2-3 years to replace them.

Drill less at the NOSC. Push more administrative requirements to the operational command. Encourage flex-drill, combinations of active-duty and drills at the active duty site, or other ways to reduce drilling just for administrative purposes at the NOSC. “Whenever possible, our RC Sailors have indicated a strong desire to “flex drill” at the AC supported commands, which achieves a greater level of readiness and operational support, as well as Total Force integration.”⁵¹ In effect, don’t let the administrative requirements from a NOSC hamper your operational support to your AC Unit.

Create a subspecialty or “core” of Joint-Interagency trained Reservists. This core can be a major supplemental player for the envisioned *National Security Officer* program. A Joint-Interagency career track in the Reserve Force can help build on Goldwater-Nichols, and jump-start an Interagency Goldwater-Nichols II. This allows more reservists to “flex” to National and COCOM needs and allows the nation to tap this expertise later on in the sailors’ career.

Expand the Navy’s Joint education throughout the sailor’s career and develop the CNGR recommendations.⁵² Here, continued promotion is vital. No penalty should be imposed for taking a Joint-active billet, vice a strategic reserve billet.⁵³ Here we can directly contribute to national requirements. In addition, ease the flexibility for reservists to fill any unused Joint

education billets. It is a travesty that the Navy has left empty billets unfilled this year at the nation's Staff and War colleges and was *the only service* not represented in this year's National Security Fellows class at Harvard University.⁵⁴ Reserves could have filled these lost opportunities.

We need to *make it easier* for reservists to *fill an active duty billet* either by recall to active duty or mobilization for the normal active duration of the billet. This way, a sailor isn't mobilized for 6-12 months, finally competent in the actual job requirements, and then dumped back into his/her unrelated Reserve unit. Allowing the member to stay on active duty for 2-3 years allows better job accomplishment, less friction/change with the member's family, and increases the member's continued integration with the active force. This allows the detailers the chance to get the billet back in the normal PCS cycle, or perhaps finds a Reserve rotation for this billet. Quality of life is also improved for the sailor.

Make reservists eligible and required for rotation in certain COCOM active duty billets to keep Reservists in the loop, and augment Navy requirements, keeping our officers and senior enlisted well integrated in the Total Force. These recommendations may require rewording of Title 10 for mobilization lengths or modification for recalls of active duty of a reservist to not count against active manning end strength.

Finally, use the CNGR recommendations for DOD implementation plans for Joint, and Homeland defense missions for Reserve Personnel. These can validate the needs of the Reserve-Active Mix. Expand on CNGR with Reserve billet support to inter-agencies as well as Joint commands. Develop pilot programs for Reserve support to Department of State, Homeland Security, and selected geographical states. Increase Foreign Affairs Officer opportunities for Reservists by training those requesting language or regional studies to qualify.

Move the Navy Reserves Forward – Final Recommendations

CNCR has given the Navy a great opportunity to give a meaningful “rudder check” for the Reserves. With the Navy just coming to terms with its new mission sets, the Navy Reserve sits at a pivotal point in its direction for the next few decades. As the Reserves have been “operationalized” out of necessity, recent CNO calls for “Institutionalizing the Reserves”, and our new President calling for rebuilding the Reserves, the Navy Reserve must make a stake in its future with the Navy and the Total Force. Here is the 11-step strategy:

- Reassess our Reserve sailors. Expand upon the CNO directed assessment to include skill sets of active experience, civilian expertise, the desire for mobilization, recalls to active duty, and the desire for increased in-active support.
- Complete a “needs-based” review of RC billets for active Navy mission requirements based on our new “balanced strategy” as outlined by the Secretary of Defense and our forthcoming military roles and missions review. Have the AC include all drill requirements for the reservist. Delineate which RC billets should shift drill sites to the Operational command site. Categorize “operational” and “strategic” reserve units.⁵⁵
- Follow the sailor and billet review with recommendations for alignment and restructuring. Coordinate with CNRFC and CFFC. Integrate with CNO and DOD guidance for further integration of active and reserve component management.⁵⁶ How does this match the current level of about 64% of Reserve Units being Strategic in support? Is 60-70 % a good goal?
- Develop a National Security Officer program for the Reserves. Expand the JPME in-residence program for reservists by allowing Reserves to fill last-minute unfilled AC billets at any Joint/University educational opportunity. Follow with regular PCS orders

to a joint or Inter-agency billet for 24-36 months, instead of the current payback of an unknown mobilization to unknown destination at an unknown date. Further support NSOs with volunteer recall opportunities to active duty, and engage in Title-10 law changes to enable this core competency.

- Begin reducing FTS recruiting/manning for current FTS billets at the NOSC level. Bring in a mix of active duty and SELRES on recall to active duty to fill those FTS billets. Shift more FTS to operational and Joint-Interagency billets. In five years reassess effect of new SELRES drill sites, reduced FTS manning and NOSC efficiency.
- Pay sailors per diem to travel to drill sites over 50 miles from home. This should be transparent regardless of the required site being a NOSC, a “telecommuting site,” or the operational command for flex drill or actual drills. If a sailor is directed to go to any location to do their required drills, the Navy should be paying for travel. At a minimum change the deductibility of travel expenses from the current 100 miles, to 50 miles.
- Expand the use of flex drilling. Utilize flex drill and IDTT to better support the operational command, and de-conflict with their civilian job and family. Get away from the mindset of drilling once a month at the local NOSC just because we always have. Drill when it’s beneficial to the SELRES and the supported command. Maximize Reserve drill days at the supported command, instead of at the NOSC.
- A few times in a career, give the NR sailor the option of choosing an “operational” reserve unit or a “strategic” reserve unit. Investigate options of using dwell times in strategic units to allow sailors to complete degrees, job requirements, or family issues, before returning to operational units where increased participation is required. Allow the use of flexible incentives to keep the operational units manned voluntarily.

Incentives could be TSP matching, earlier promotion, incentive pay, opportunity for active “sanctuary,” or earlier retirement for recalls or mobilization to active duty.

- Research opportunities with civilian employer partnerships. Tax incentives for hiring reservists, tax breaks when a reservist is mobilized, increased known dwell times, shared job training, retirement and/or healthcare costs, should all be explored. Get feedback on how the Army partnership with Wal-Mart is developing and how it can be approved. Learn from the recent Air Force call for officers to return to active service. Explore setting up a similar Navy Reserve programs.
- In the light of CoS, expand or re-write portions of Title 10 to give more flexibility to the Reserves for expanded volunteer mobilizations and recalls to active duty. Engage think tanks and work with DOD transformation offices to coordinate impacts. Utilize bonuses already approved in FY 2007 for active support by reservists to LS/HD “combat support” billets.⁵⁷ Counter these think tanks with ideas from your the Naval force.
- Correct the current unbalanced incentive of earlier Reserve retirement for those mobilized for operations when the next defense bill is submitted. Make the start date September 11, 2001 (vice Jan 2008), modify the current 90-day counter/clock to ignore FY resets, and include any type of orders to active duty, not just mobilizations.

Disregarding those that have served since 9-11 is a disservice to their contributions.

Total Force requirements have shaped our Reserves into an operational force, it is now up to the Navy to sustain, maintain and institutionalize the Reserve force. Using CNGR, similar studies, the CNO’s 2008 memo, and the just released Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, dated October 29, 2008, the Navy has the recommendations, the tools, and the requirement to sustain the force structure, retention, and the support required from the AC. With this strategy, we can

move the Navy Reserve forward, improve it for our sailors, and increase the support to the Total Force. Instead of fearing change, or shirking at the effort it will take to fully utilize our Reserves, the Navy *can* make this leap forward to *sustain and institute* this recent change to an operationalized Reserve force.

ANNEX A – DOD Directive 1200.17

Just released Department of Defense Directive 1200.17, dated October 29, 2008 states:

It is DOD policy that:

- a. The RC's provide operational capabilities and strategic depth to meet U.S. defense requirements across the full spectrum of conflict....
- b. The AC's and RC's are integrated as a total force based on the attributes of the particular component and individual competencies.⁵⁸

These two recommendations are similar to my first two recommendations linking Total Force requirements of the service, with the skill set of the Reserves, making adjustments to both to maximize the return of our Reserve forces. Some common highlights are below:

- h. Ensure force rebalancing is conducted on a continuing basis to adjust force structure and individual skill inventories to meet full spectrum operations while moderating excessive utilization of the total force. Such rebalancing shall result in a force mix that takes into account AC and RC capabilities and capacities.
- i. Integrate AC and RC organizations to the greatest extent practicable, including the use of cross-component assignments, both AC to RC and RC to AC. Such assignments should be considered as career enhancing and not detrimental to a Service member's career progression.
- j. Align, to the extent practicable, force structure with established DOD goals for frequency and duration of utilization for unit and individuals.
- k. Ensure the appropriate level of full-time support personnel -- AC, Active Guard and Reserve, military technicians (dual-status), non-dual status technicians, and other Federal civilian employees -- to meet the readiness requirements of the RCs.
- l. Implement the continuum of service construct in ways that sustain the all-volunteer force and the willingness of individuals to serve.
 - (1) Provide flexible service options, consistent with DOD policies, making military duty attractive to a broad population.
 - (2) Execute the appropriate range of compensation, benefits, and incentives to sustain the all-volunteer force commensurate with the service provided. This encourages Service members to continue to serve.

(3) Implement utilization rules for voluntary and involuntary service that are clear and effectively communicated. Implement related expectation management programs to provide members, families, and employers' maximum predictability and planning consistent with operational requirements.

m. To facilitate the sustainment of volunteerism:

(1) Provide opportunities for and encourage the performance of military duty beyond minimum participation requirements, consistent with Service needs.

(2) Provide flexible participation options that conform to mission requirements.

(a) As appropriate, provide monetary and non-monetary incentives to increase the level of participation above and beyond minimum requirements.

(b) Offer choices among available incentives according to individual preferences to accomplish force management objectives.

(c) Execute Military Service agreements and incentives to ensure the availability of individuals who may be needed on short notice to meet mission requirements.⁵⁹

ANNEX B – 24 November 2008 DOD Memo on Recommendations of the CNGR

After the CNGR's recommendations were released, the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) formed a working group to "assess the recommendations and to provide... proposed actions."⁶⁰

The Secretary concluded that 82 of the 95 CNGR recommendations either require no action or further actions already underway. Accordingly, he directs implementation plans be developed for 53 plans, and no action required for 29 others. On the whole, his working group completed a respectable assessment of the recommendations, but missed the boat on several service interpretations and allowing the services too much leeway on others. As mentioned many times in my paper, interpretations and implementations are the key to success for the CNGR recommendations and the way ahead.

For personnel management strategy and CoS, the SECDEF directs OSD and the services to evaluate if the services are adapting to the manpower needs of the next century and a strategy of implementing a Continuum of Service construct. This report will be valuable to see if the services indeed offer a legitimate change to our current operations for manpower.

Another good shift comes under recommendation 12 and the applicability of Goldwater-Nichols. The SECDEF here assigns the Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness to see if recent ordered changes that direct Reserve billets to be added to Joint Duty Assignment Lists go far enough to qualify enough Reserve officers for Flag rank. He further directs the service secretaries to report back on their efforts to integrate Reserve component officers with AC officers for joint duty and education. With Joint education billets going unfilled and little analysis of how many reservists need training, this is necessary.

Contrarily, for recommendation 13, the DOD comes up short. Here the CNGR recommends expanding the number of funded slots for reservists to National Defense University, the service war colleges, and JPME II. In the DOD analysis, it only mentions expanding distance learning of JPME II and CAPSTONE requirements for reservists, never mentioning increasing reserve slots at the war colleges, or using reservists as “last minute fills.” Unfortunately, the Navy still needs to expand here, as many Navy SELRES are not even aware of the current limited in-residence program. Thankfully, DOD does concur with the CNGR to expand all required Enlisted Professional Military Education in accordance with Commander Joint Chief of Staff Instruction 1805.1.

Addressing the Navy FTS program, the SECDEF directs a “senior level review” of existing law and policy regarding the FTS program, including individual assessments for each service. Bottom line, he gives the review a great bit of leeway, allowing each service to manage its FTS personnel to effectively perform their service missions. With this, the Navy is unlikely to make any needed change, CNGR or otherwise, to its current FTS program. The Navy needs more than just a cursory senior level review here.

Jumping to the Total Force Policy recommendations, the Navy is given an opportunity to change FTS and Reserve assignments. Specifically, recommendation #82 from the CNGR promotes the idea of sending AC officers to reserve assignments and RC officers to active assignments and such assignments be considered favorable for promotion. DOD wavers a little by asking the service secretaries if it is feasible or even advisable to provide officers a “broader Total Force perspective”⁶¹ This is definitely a weak proposal by DOD to look at this required recommendation. If we are to become a “Total Force” or “One-Navy” as DOD and the services proclaim, it is surprising they don’t endorse this recommendation to help this actually occur. The Navy has always worked to broaden an officer’s experience beyond his or her warfare specialty, and DOD should do the same for broadening Joint-Interagency experience.

Similarly the response to recommendation #83, which advocates selecting senior billets for officers and enlisted to be assigned without geographic restrictions by allowing travel allowances to pay for required travel sends a mixed message to the Reserves. DOD directs a review of O-5/6 and E-8/9 billet assignments that should be made available and the potential cost to the service without mentioning the potential benefits. I expect the outcome to mirror the “no further action” required from recommendation 53, which advises the services to pay for travel required for reserve drills. Here the DOD incorrectly interprets this to mean per section 408a of Title 37, U.S. Code, as added from section 631 of the 2008 NDAA, which authorizes the services to pay for drill “outside of normal commuting area”⁶² if such member is in a critically staffed skill or pay grade or is relocated for such reasons as BRAC. This seems different to CNGR’s interpretation, as its wording seems to suggest paying for *any* travel required for drill periods and services to budget for this using *existing* code. No action required for the Navy means no change, and continued no in their budget. Travel costs for Reserve members will continue to

come out of their own pockets and this will hamper sending the most qualified sailor to the correct billet, or unfairly burden the Reserve sailor to pay for the Navy's job required expense. "Unfair and unequal" remains.

For a required single pay and reserve personnel system, described in CNGR recommendation #21, DOD states "no further action is required." The Marine Corps is already compliant. The Army is scheduled to receive the Defense Integrated Military Resources System (DIMHRS) in March of 2009 and the Air Force to follow in October 2009. Once again, the Navy is at the tail with an "undetermined future date" for DIMHRS. This is despite having the system a priority for at least the last 10 years. This is a core requirement for CoS, smooth mobilizations, and reduced expenses for the Navy. An unknown date is a disappointing answer.

Another disappointment came with the response to recommendation #27-28 for a single reformed retirement system. DOD punts here by saying no further action required since they completed the Tenth Quadrennial Review of the Retirement System dated July 2008.⁶³ Despite the controversial and theoretical impacts to the active and reserve force, it does not call for more analysis, costs or manning losses, or recommended any way ahead for implementing possible changes. DOD implies "fairness" here to mean, implement the previous plan of delaying AC retirement pay to the RC system of delayed retirement pay, and allowing a sailor to become "vested" in this retirement system with as little as ten years service. This could trade the current loss of sailors at the 20 year point, to losing them earlier at the 10 year point with no reason to go to 20 or contribute to the CoS, further contributing to mid-level sailor losses. Further study is warranted here; along with a study of reduced retirement age plans for Reserves as a way of maintaining force structure and manning. In addition, no recommendations are mentioned to fix the current unbalanced early retirement system or start date of January 2008.

DOD also offers several areas where “No action is directed.” For Reserve Component categories as stated in recommendation #86, DOD disagrees with the CNGR’s recommendations as described. CNGR tries to suggest an Army Reserve like model for Strategic Reserve and Operational Reserve to apply to SELRES, IRR and Retired-Reserve. This is probably not the right model to rubber stamp on the different services. They all mobilize reservists quite differently. Perhaps a different re-characterization of Reserve Units as strategic or operational would put a better label on what has already become commonly known by most units describing the likeliness of mobilization. Also, more frequent statistics by rate/rank of frequency of mobilization would also help inform the SELRES on potential IA mobilizations or help promote a “voluntary mobilization” that might better utilize the sailor’s skills than an involuntary assignment. This is far from no action required.

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¹ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Final Report: Executive Summary, January 31, 2008. [\[Link to: CNGRFinalReportExecutiveSummary.pdf\]](#)

² Admiral Michael G. Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Letter to the Troops," October 1, 2007. [PDF of Admiral Mullen's letter to the troops Oct 1, 2007.](#)

³ 10 U.S.C. 10102. The language was recently changed by P.L. 108-375, the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for FY2005. Prior to this change, the language was as follows: "The purpose of each reserve component is to provide trained units and qualified persons available for active duty in the armed forces, in time of war or national emergency, and at such other times as the national security may require, to fill the needs of the armed forces

whenever, during and after the period needed to procure and train additional units and qualified persons to achieve the planned mobilization, more units and persons are needed than are in the regular components.” The change in statutory language, as explained in a House Armed Services Committee report, would “clarify that the purpose of the reserve components is to provide trained units and qualified personnel [my emphasis] not just as the result of involuntary mobilizations but whenever more units and persons are needed than are in the active component. The revision recommended by this section more accurately reflects recent and future employments of the reserve components.” H. Rept. 108-491, p. 316.

⁴ Commander, Navy Reserve Forces Command (CNRFC), Navy Reserve Mission Statement, December 1 2008, [CNRF Homepage - Mission Statement](#).

⁵ Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, U. S. Navy, Chief Of Navy Reserve Before The Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee On Personnel On Fiscal Year 2007 National Guard And Reserve Component Programs, March 30, 2006. “Excellent examples of ARI are highlighted in CENTCOM, where 50 percent of the Navy individual augmentees (IA) requirement is being met by RC Sailors.”

⁶ Martin Binkin, *Who Will Fight the Next War?: The Changing Face of the American Military*, Brookings Institute Press, Washington, DC, 1993, 151. Binkin summarizes that Army Reserve costs about 25% of their active counterparts. Operational equipment Air Force Units cost about 60% of the active costs, and at the high end of the scale, and a Reserve naval ship at 80-90% of an active cost. Both of the Air Force and active estimates include the high amount of active force required to operate those Units. Therefore, we can estimate recent “strategic” naval reserve units would only cost about 25% of a comparable unit would cost. Worst case, an integrated air/surface unit might still cost might run only 25-50% of a full time active unit. The amount is even smaller, as stand alone Reserve aviation and ship Units are almost unheard of, outside of VR. Most squadrons have been integrated with active Units, adding to the cost “savings” tremendously.

⁷ Senior General, USMC, speaking to the AWC in Jones Auditorium, September 2008.

⁸ Senior General, USMC, speaking to the AWC in Jones Auditorium, September 2008. “fight across the spectrum” is also frequently mentioned in a myriad of DOD documents, most notable the recent release of DOD Directive (DODD) 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, 29 October 2008.

⁹ Hans Binnendijk, Michael J. Baranick, Raymond Bell, Gina Cordero, Stephen M. Duncan, Christopher Holshek, and Larry Wentz, *Transforming the Reserve Component: Four Essays*, (Washington D.C.: National Defense University, February 2005), 3. From the abstract: “The essay calls for a fundamental restructuring of the Reserve Component in light of the largest mobilization since the Korean War, which has been fraught with problems in terms of combat readiness as well as pay, morale, and retention. Binnendijk and Cordero argue that a high-level national commission may be needed to design and gain support for that restructuring. Hans Binnendijk holds the Roosevelt Chair of National Security Policy at the National Defense University and is Director of the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP). He previously served on the National Security Council as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Defense Policy and Arms Control (1999-2001). Gina Cordero is a Research Associate at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy, where she focuses on force transformation and transatlantic relations. She has previously worked at the Atlantic Council of the United States and has a B.A. in International Relations and Political Science from Boston University.”

¹⁰ Barry R. McCaffrey, General USA-Ret, Adjunct Professor of International Affairs, to Colonel Michael Meese, Professor and Head Dept of Social Studies, United States Military Academy, memorandum, *After Action Report – Visit Iraq and Kuwait 5-11 December 2007*, 18 December 2007, 10.

¹¹ Peggy Golfín, *SELRES Manning in Limited-Supply/High-Demand Skills*, Center for Naval Analysis, Powerpoint presentation, 07 May 2008.

¹² “red flag” means that the Navy stops any sailor getting mobilized or returning to active duty that has over 16 years active duty time in their Reserve career. This is due to a 12 month mobilization possibly getting extended up to 24 months, leaving the Navy on the hook for paying for an active duty retirement for the reservist after they claim “sanctuary” for an AC retirement once the sailor crosses 18 years. Crossing this 16 year hurdle requires the painful and often unsuccessful request for sanctuary. Interestingly, other services are unfamiliar with this “early sanctuary” screening, and just worry about crossing the 18 year mark. This allows them another 2 years of service out of their most qualified reservists.

¹³ “Navy Exceeds '08 Enlistment Goals,” *Stars and Stripes*, December 10, 2008, <http://www.military.com/features/0,15240,180896,00.html?ESRC=navynews.RSS>. “For sailors with six years' service or less, and sailors with six to 10 years' service, re-enlistments surpassed the Navy's goals by about 2 percent. For those with 10 to 14 years of service, however, the Navy missed its retention goal by about 2 percent. Actual re-enlistment figures were not included in the message.”

¹⁴ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Final Report: Executive Summary, 17.

¹⁵ Secretary of Defense, *Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves*, memorandum for distribution, 24 November 2008, 1-3.

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- ¹⁶ Department of Defense, *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006, 79. [QDR-2006-report.pdf](#).
- ¹⁷ Matthew F. Bogdanos, Joint Interagency Coordination Group (JIACG) Mission, CCJIACG Position Paper (MacDill Air Force Base: U.S. Central Command, FL, September 17, 2002).
- ¹⁸ Currently, the first Navy Reservists allowed to in-residence JPME programs are in those programs starting in 2008. For example, Air Command and Staff College has one Navy Reserve LCDR in-residence, and the Air War College also has one reserve CDR in-residence. Similarly, the first in-residence reservist to the Naval War College started in February 2008.
- ¹⁹ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Final Report: Executive Summary, 33, 39. CNGR recommendation 17b states: “Congress should amend the Goldwater-Nichols Act to require that the level of RC officer representation in service headquarters and joint organization including COCOMs and the Joint Staff, be commensurate with the significant role that the Reserve component plays in DOD’s overall missions.”
- CNGR recommendation 25: “As a part of the process of simplifying duty status categories, Congress should phase out the ADOS category and designate long-term billets as either active duty or civilian or as part of a program that rotates reserve members on full-time active duty tours. Such a program would benefit both the reservists, to whom it would provide career-broadening experience, and DOD, which would take advantage of the unique talents and experience within the reserve component.”
- ²⁰ Tom Philpott, Contributing Editor “Action in Congress, Help for Guard and Reserve; DOD Issues CRSC Guidance; Watch Those Entitlements,” *AIR FORCE Magazine*, June 2004, 24.
- ²¹ *Ibid.*, 25.
- ²² Stephen M. Duncan, *Transforming the Reserve Component: Four Essays*, “Homeland Security and the Reconstruction of U.S. Reserve Forces,” 12. From the abstract: “Stephen M. Duncan calls for a complete re-thinking of U.S. security requirements and force structure, with an emphasis on homeland security. Stephen M. Duncan is the Director of the Institute for Homeland Security Studies (IHSS) at the National Defense University. Mr. Duncan served as Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs from 1987 to 1993. He is the author of *Citizen Warriors: America's National Guard and Reserve Forces & the Politics of National Security* and *A War of a Different Kind: Military Force and America's Search for Homeland Security*.”
- ²³ Beth J. Asch, James Hosek, David Loughran, *Reserve Retirement Reform: A Viewpoint on Recent Congressional Proposals*, RAND report for the Office of the Secretary of Defense (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2006) iii.
- ²⁴ Lt Col Timothy M. Clarke, “Reserve Retirement for an Operational Reserve,” Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2007), x.
- ²⁵ *Ibid.*, ix.
- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, abstract.
- ²⁷ Raymond E. Bell, Jr., *Transforming the Reserve Component: Four Essays*, “Toward Cultural Change of the Total Army,” 26.
- ²⁸ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Final Report: Executive Summary, 71. CNGR recommendation 82 suggests more active integration with Reserve Units. The NOSC is a great place to start. Recommendation 82: “The service secretaries should ensure that active component officers are encouraged to serve in reserve component units and that such service is considered favorably when determining who is most qualified for promotion.”
- ²⁹ *Ibid.*, 55.
- ³⁰ *Ibid.*, 57.
- ³¹ Department of the Navy, Commander Navy Reserve Forces Command, notice for distribution, Notice 1001, Fiscal Year 2009 (FY09) Policy Execution Guidance, September 26, 2008, 4, [COMNAVRESFORCOM Notice 1001](#).
- ³² “Institutionalizing the Operational Navy Reserve,” *Naval Reserve Association News*, October 2008, Volume 55, No. 10, 7.
- ³³ Vice Admiral Cotton, Commander Navy Reserve Force. Quoted in “Service Sections,” *The Officer*, April 2004, 44.
- ³⁴ US Government Accounting Office, *Force Structure: Assessments of Navy Reserve Manpower Requirements Need to Consider the Most Cost Effective Mix of Active and Reserve Manpower to Meet Mission Needs*, October 2005, highlights page.
- ³⁵ *Ibid.*
- ³⁶ Chief of Naval Operations, memorandum for distribution, *Tasking Assignments to Institutionalize the Navy Reserve*, February 21 2008.
- ³⁷ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Final Report: Executive Summary, 37. CNGR report recommendation 22: “DOD should reduce the number of duty statuses from the current 29 to 2: on (active) duty and off (active) duty. All reserve duty will be considered active duty, with appropriate pay and other compensation. The 48 drills should be replaced with 24 days of

active duty. A day's pay should be provided for a day's work without reducing compensation for current service members. The system should be sufficiently flexible to deal with service-specific training requirements.”

³⁸ Congress inserted language in the FY 2008 Defense bill that will require DOD to review Roles and Missions every four years to Congress. This was inserted because Congress believes the military is still aligned to fight nation-state type wars, and needs to look at non-traditional roles, irregular warfare, and nation building. The first report will be due prior to submitting the budget in 2009. This will be a great opportunity to re-assess the Navy Reserve.

³⁹ Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 2009, summary. “The Pentagon has to do more than modernize its conventional forces; it must also focus on today's unconventional conflicts -- and tomorrow's.”

⁴⁰ Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Final Report: Executive Summary, 49. Coincidentally, this agrees with CNGR recommendation 40-b: “The services should disclose fully to all prospective members of units the expected number of training days required annually to participate successfully in that unit. Annual training requirements beyond the traditional 39 days per year should be based on unit needs and accomplished by clear mutual agreement with the individual service member regarding his or her minimum obligation.”

⁴¹ Rear Adm. John Debbout, Commander, Reserve Forces Command, *Reserve Forces Command Shares New Alignment Plan for Navy*, Lt. Leslie I. Smith, Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Europe Public Affairs, June 9 2004, http://www.navy.mil/search/display.asp?story_id=13674.

⁴² Associated Press, “Wal-Mart, Army Reserve Link for Recruiting, Hiring,” *Yahoo Finance News*, 12 November, 2008, http://biz.yahoo.com/ap/081111/wal_mart_army_reserve.html?.v=1.

⁴³ Compensation and Voluntary Participation in a Continuum of Service, Center for Naval Analysis (CNA): Alexandria, VA, March 2006.

⁴⁴ Rear Adm. John Debbout, Commander, Reserve Forces Command, *Reserve Forces Command Shares New Alignment Plan for Navy*.

⁴⁵ Oren Harari, “People over Plans,” *The Leadership Secrets of Colin Powell*, 1st ed., chapter 8, (New York, NY: McGraw Hill Publishing, 2002), 127-128.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Department of Defense: “Developing a 21st Century Total Force,” *Quadrennial Defense Review Report*, February 6, 2006, 75.

⁴⁸ Robert M. Gates, “A Balanced Strategy,” *Foreign Affairs*, 1.

⁴⁹ “Interview with ... Vice Admiral Dirk J. Debbink Chief of Navy Reserve,” *Naval Reserve Association News*, October 2008, 15.

⁵⁰ Department of the Navy, *DOD Base Closure and Realignment Report to the Commission, Analysis and Recommendations (Vol IV)*, May 2005, Appendix F-5. A quote from the recommendations follows: “For Navy Reserve Centers, these recommendations close 35 activities and retain 117 centers. Excess capacity is reduced from 14.0 percent to 3.1 percent and military value increased from 59.96 to 61.75. For Marine Corps Reserve Centers, the analysis sought to optimally locate activities. Two facilities were identified for closure and movement to existing Navy owned facilities, keeping 32 Marine Corps owned reserve facilities open. Excess capacity is reduced by 5.5 percent. The average military value for Marine Corps Reserve Centers does not change because the two actions move the Marine units onto nearby active duty installations with valued characteristics, thereby enhancing the military value. The net savings to the Department over 20 years for all 37 closure recommendations is approximately \$126.20 million.” That equals 6.31 million a year in savings.

⁵¹ Vice Admiral John G. Cotton, U. S. Navy, Chief Of Navy Reserve Before The Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee On Personnel On Fiscal Year 2007 National Guard And Reserve Component Programs, March 30, 2006.

⁵² Commission on the National Guard and Reserves: Transforming the National Guard and Reserves into a 21st-Century Operational Force, Final Report: Executive Summary, 31-34. CNGR recommendations 12-17.

⁵³ No penalty means the reservist has no detrimental effect for promotions or job opportunities by taking a Joint billet, vice a Navy operational or Reserve billet. In other words, he or she isn't ranked any lower than his Navy billet counterpart when it comes to APPLY billets, promotion boards, or recall opportunities.

⁵⁴ Senior university educational speaker, Jones Auditorium, Air War College, December, 2008.

⁵⁵ DOD Directive (DODD) 1200.17, *Managing the Reserve Components as an Operational Force*, 29 October 2008, 5. Specifically, it directs Secretaries of Defense to: “Manage their respective RCs as an operational force such that the RCs provide operational capabilities while maintaining strategic depth to meet U.S. military requirements across the full spectrum of conflict.”

⁵⁶ Ibid., 6. “Ensure force rebalancing is conducted on a continuing basis to adjust force structure and individual skill inventories to meet full spectrum operations while moderating excessive utilization of the total force. Such rebalancing shall result in a force mix that takes into account AC and RC capabilities and capacities.”

⁵⁷ LT Marc J. Soss, SC, USN, “The FY 2007 NDAA's Impact on Navy Reservists,” *Navy Supply Corps Newsletter*,

May/June 2007. In his article, Lt Soss describes: “Authorities and Incentives for Reserve Component Members to Volunteer to Serve on Active Duty (Section 329 of Chapter 5 of title 37): Authorizes the Secretary of Defense to pay a bonus to a Reservist who volunteers for high-demand, low-density assignments (combat, combat support or service support capability) or in any other specialty designated as critical to meet wartime or peacetime requirements. Eligibility for the bonus requires the Reservist to enter into a written agreement to serve on active duty for a specified period and non-eligibility for promotion while serving in the assignment.” This could be an underutilized but necessary tool for more volunteer support.

⁵⁸ DOD Directive (DODD) 1200.17, 1.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, 6.

⁶⁰ Secretary of Defense, *Recommendations of the Commission on the National Guard and Reserves*, memorandum for distribution, 24 November 2008, 1.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*, 20.

⁶² *Ibid.*, Attachment 2, 7.

⁶³ William H. McMichael, “DOD Study Urges Sweeping Retirement Overhaul,” *Navy Times*, 11 August 2008. http://www.navytimes.com/news/2008/08/military_qrnc_retirement_080508w/